Enhancing Critical Thinking Through Creation of Learning Organizations Within the Confines of an Overarching Mechanistic Organization by Riel, David
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
DSpace Repository
Acquisition Research Program Acquisition Research Symposium
2015-04-01
Enhancing Critical Thinking Through Creation
of Learning Organizations Within the Confines
of an Overarching Mechanistic Organization
Riel, David
Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/53668
This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United
States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the
United States.












Enhancing Critical Thinking Through Creation of 
Learning Organizations Within the Confines of an 
Overarching Mechanistic Organization 
David Riel, DAU 
Published April 30, 2015 
Disclaimer: The views represented in this report are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy 





The research presented in this report was supported by the Acquisition Research 
Program of the Graduate School of Business & Public Policy at the Naval 
Postgraduate School. 
To request defense acquisition research, to become a research sponsor, or to print 
additional copies of reports, please contact any of the staff listed on the Acquisition 
Research Program website (www.acquisitionresearch.net).
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ãW=
`êÉ~íáåÖ=póåÉêÖó=Ñçê=fåÑçêãÉÇ=`Ü~åÖÉ= - 65 - 
Enhancing Critical Thinking Through Creation of Learning 
Organizations Within the Confines of an Overarching 
Mechanistic Organization 
David Riel—is currently a Professor of Acquisition Management for Defense Acquisition University’s 
Midwest region with Level III certifications in PM and PQM. His 20-year U.S. Air Force career 
includes working on a variety of programs including the F-22 and Global Hawk. He also spent several 
years working as senior manager of manufacturing and continuous improvement with one of our 
defense industry partners. [david.riel@dau.mil] 
Abstract 
The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics has highlighted 
the need for acquisition professionals to apply critical thinking in executing programs. Quotes 
include “[BBP 2.0] is not intended to be a ‘school solution’ or a checklist of ideas for you to 
unthinkingly ‘check off.’ BBP 2.0 … is designed … to drive critical thought in the daily 
execution of our work” (Kendall, 2013, p. 2); and “nothing is more important to our success 
than our ability to understand, think critically, and make sound decisions” (Kendall, 2014, p. 
3). This has led to requests for greater education and training in critical thinking. However, 
these perspectives don’t include the importance of organizational structure in fostering critical 
thinking. Since Fredrick the Great instituted drill and discipline to manage his conscripts, the 
military structure can best be described as mechanistic, emphasizing hierarchal power, 
specialized divisions of labor, and formal policies, at the expense of innovation and 
adaptability (Walonick, 1993). For critical thinking to thrive, the acquisition community needs 
to transition to learning organizations capable of initiating and conveying knowledge 
(Giesecke & McNeil, 2004). This research studies workers’ perceptions of the mechanistic 
behavior their organizations exhibit and reveals ways to adopt learning organizations within 
the confines of the Department of Defense’s mechanistic organization. 
Introduction 
Over the past several years, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisitions, 
Technology, and Logistics (USD[AT&L]) has highlighted the need for the Department of 
Defense’s (DoD’s) acquisition workforce to apply critical thinking skills in executing 
acquisition programs. Quotes include “Like BBP 1.0, it [BBP 2.0] is not intended to be a 
‘school solution’ or a checklist of ideas for you to unthinkingly ‘check off.’ BBP 2.0 is 
consistent with my goals and priorities, and it is designed in large part to drive critical 
thought in the daily execution of our work” (Kendall, 2013, p. 2); and “nothing is more 
important to our success than our professional ability to understand, think critically, and 
make sound decisions” (Kendall, 2014, p. 3). This has led to requests for greater education 
and training in critical thinking skills, including a recent article, which states, “Unfortunately, 
the DoD acquisition education system is not designed to develop critical thinkers” (Frisbee & 
Reynolds, 2014, p. 18). While valid, these perspectives do not take into account the 
importance of organizational structure and culture in fostering critical thinking.  
Since the 18th century when Frederick the Great instituted a focus on drill and 
discipline to manage his conscripts, the military’s organizational structure can best be 
described as mechanistic, emphasizing the need for hierarchal power, specialized divisions 
of labor, and formal rules, operating instructions and policies, at the expense of personal 
growth, innovation, and adaptability (Walonick, 1993). For critical thinking to thrive, one 
could posit that the acquisition community needs to transition from mechanistic to learning 
organizations capable of initiating, obtaining, and conveying knowledge, while continuously 
improving behavior and processes to reflect newly-found knowledge and insights (Giesecke 
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& McNeil, 2004). This research studies the perceptions of acquisition workers to the degree 
of mechanistic behavior that their top and immediate organizations exhibit and also reveals 
methods for adopting learning organizations within the confines of the DoD’s mechanistic 
organization to embrace innovative and adaptive approaches to manage today’s complex 
defense programs. 
Organizational Structure and Culture 
The DoD’s mechanistic organization can be linked as far back as the reign of 
Frederick the Great, whose military celebrity is founded on strict discipline and repetitive drill 
in molding conscripts for the service of professional arms (Showalter, 2007). Mechanistic 
behavior implies that the organization is designed to run like a machine in a “routinized, 
efficient, reliable, and predictable way” (Morgan, 2006, p. 13). Morgan (2006) cites the 
military and, in particular, Frederick the Great’s, methodology to transform the lowly 
members of society into a superior fighting force as the prototypical depiction of a 
mechanistic organization. The term mechanistic intimates the metaphor of a machine with its 
precisely operating mechanisms producing predictable output, each organizational entity 
doing exactly what it is designed to do within the confines of that operation (“Mechanistic 
Organizations,” n.d.).  
Mechanistic organizations are characterized by high levels of hierarchical structure 
and control; clearly defined roles and responsibilities; written policies and procedures; 
specialized, standardized tasks; and centralized decision-making processes, which research 
has indicated tend to restrict innovation, flexibility, and creativity (Hatch & Cunliffe, 2013). 
Mechanistic organizations are designed to achieve preordained goals using predetermined 
regulations, policies, events, or standards, which can be problematic in a complex and 
changing environment (Morgan, 1986; “Mechanistic Organizations,” n.d.). However, 
advantages of the mechanistic organization are that formalization and control often lead to 
higher efficiencies through lessened variation and improved predictability, which are very 
attractive attributes in a risk-averse environment (“Mechanistic Organization,” n.d.). 
Therefore, the mechanistic structure tends to buttress past practices rather than challenge 
the status quo, making adaptations to known methods, such as the DoDI 5000.02 
acquisition models, uncomfortable for those being held accountable for results (Fiol & Lyles, 
1985). Functional specialization, another key characteristic of mechanistic organizations and 
the acquisition workforce, while providing the specific skills needed to navigate the complex 
world of DoD acquisitions, also contributes to myopic optimization of programmatic sub-
goals, such as security, iron-clad contracts, gold-plated performance, financial constraint, 
and optimal quality, with the program manager bearing the sole responsible for seeing the 
product as a whole—cost, schedule, and performance. Organizational structure deeply 
induces and is heavily interwoven with its organizational culture, including a demonstrated 
“negative correlation between centralization and innovation” (Whittinghill, 2011, p. 17). 
Schein’s Theory of Culture posits that a set of basic assumptions, which are taken 
for granted by the culture’s participant, form the foundation of a culture (Hatch & Cunliffe, 
2013). For example, in America, the rights of free speech and representative government 
are basic cultural assumptions. Even as our awareness of these basic assumptions fade, 
they influence our perceptions, thoughts, and feelings (Hatch & Cunliffe, 2013). Values, the 
next level of culture, provides the “social principles, goals, and standards that cultural 
members believe have intrinsic worth” (p. 169), guiding members in their concept of right 
and wrong and leading to defined behavioral norms and expectations (Hatch & Cunliffe, 
2013). The third and final level of Schein’s construct is artifacts, which are the manifestation 
of values and norms in objects, verbal expressions, and activities (Hatch & Cunliffe, 2013). 
The U.S. Marines expression of semper fidelis, Latin for always faithful, provides an 
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excellent example of an artifact derived from the values of honor and duty to country and 
fellow marines. 
Origins—The DoD as a Mechanistic Organization  
The DoD, especially its military services, has a notoriously mechanistic structure and 
culture brought on by early adhesion by the Continental Army to the precepts of Frederick 
the Great and continuing through the influences of powerful secretaries of defense, such as 
Secretary McNamara and Donald Rumsfeld (Whittinghill, 2011; Meilinger, 2007). However, 
originating from an application of Taylor’s scientific management, our military educational 
approach of “crawl–walk–run” runs contrary to the Prussian cadets’ training in problem 
solving of complex issues, highlighted by America’s lack of preparation for World War I’s 
large scale warfare and our alliance with France (Vandergriff, 2005). 
As early as 1897, Major Eben Swift adopted and adapted Taylor’s scientific 
management philosophy to the U.S. Army by instituting a checklist approach to warfighting 
through instruction at the Army’s Staff College at Fort Leavenworth (Vandergriff, 2005). As 
America entered WWI, the Army found itself unprepared for the vastness of the European’s 
battlefield and followed France’s mechanistic formula, which was derived from the French 
mathematician Rene DeCarte’s teaching philosophy of breaking engineering problems into 
sequential processes; French tacticians used these same techniques to break down their 
military training into process-oriented checklists to expeditiously turn their civilians into 
soldiers (Vandergriff, 2005). With the primary emphasis on avoiding mistakes (i.e., risk 
aversion), these highly-defined processes are still adhered to today, allowing hierarchical 
control with a mechanistic organizational structure, which was boosted in the 1960s by the 
longest-tenured Secretary of Defense ever, Robert S. McNamara (Clarke, 2008). 
While Secretary McNamara is most widely known for his role in the Vietnam War, he 
was also instrumental in enhancing the DoD’s mechanistic organizational structure by 
proliferating his experience as president of Ford Motor Co. to his government service. 
McNamara is known for centralizing authority, standardizing processes, and statistically 
analyzing efficiencies, including the development of the Planning, Programming, and 
Budgeting System (PPBS), the Five (now, Future) Year Defense Plan (FYDP), and the 
application of statistical analysis to measure the efficiency in the use of defoliants, bombs, 
and cannon while fighting the Vietnam War (Thompson, 1991; Karnow, 1997). Hierarchical 
control was stifling at the highest level as many senior military leaders voiced their 
disapproval and reservations of wartime strategy only in their memoirs long after the U.S. 
withdrawal from Vietnam (Meilinger, 2007). 
Similarly, in our latest conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan, senior military leaders 
publically denounced the military strategy deployed by Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, 
however, only after they had retired (Meilinger, 2007). Yet, there has been a push towards 
creating an organization contrary to the mechanistic model, one that portrays adaptability, 
risk-taking, and innovation, highlighted by President G. W. Bush in his speech to the 
graduating U.S. Naval Academy’s Class of 2001, as he “declared a commitment to a military 
culture of risk-taking and forward thinking, and to recognizing and promoting visionary 
leaders” (Williams, 2009, p. 59). Words such as these and those spoken in 1999 by General 
Shinseki, Army Chief of Staff—“The development of bold, innovative leaders of character 
and competence is fundamental to the long-term health of the Army” (Wong, 2002, p. 1)—
indicate a desire and commitment to move away from the mechanistic model and towards 
an organic or learning organization. Yet, the rank-and-file edict of hierarchical control is 
displayed in a recent example of the comments made by Maj. Gen. James Post, the vice 
commander of Air Combat Command, when he advised lower ranking officers that “it is their 
duty to support the service’s budget priorities by refraining from offering opinions 
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inconsistent with those priorities” (p. A3) and that “talking to members of Congress about the 
capabilities of the A-10 attack aircraft is tantamount to treason” (Burns, 2015, p. A3). The 
inherent control that comes with a mechanistic organization makes expressing new ideas 
and incorporating change difficult (Morgan, 2006). 
Current Perceptions/Conditions—The DoD as a Mechanistic Organization 
Wong (2002) follows up his quotes from civilian (President Bush) and military 
leadership (Gen. Shinseki) calling for less bureaucracy and more innovation with 
perceptions of a company commander: 
Interviewer: Do you feel you’re being trained to be a creative, innovative and 
adaptive leader? 
Company Commander: They’re not telling me, “Here, you’ve got ten crews—
train them.” They’re not allowing me to devise the methods and the ways to 
get there. They’re giving me the egg and telling me how to suck it. (p. 1) 
Although this comment represents only the view of a singular individual, a recent 
study conducted by Pierce (2010) indicates a dichotomy exists between the stated desires 
of top leadership and the perceptions of U.S. Army War College students, lieutenant 
colonels, and colonels. Results from the study indicate that these future senior Army leaders 
“clearly perceive that the deep-seated underlying assumptions that comprise the Army 
culture are focused on organizational stability and control as opposed to innovation, 
flexibility, and long-term growth” (Pierce, 2010, p. 80). Of the four organizational culture 
quadrants tested, adhocracy, which features innovative, visionary leaders, scored nearly 
three times lower than the hierarchical quadrant and nearly four times lower than the market 
quadrant, both of which feature stability and control (Pierce, 2010). On the contrary, though, 
the officers preferred organizational culture where they indicated that they had the strongest 
skillset, which were the clan and adhocracy cultures, whose common dimensions include 
flexibility and discretion, “providing strong support for the contention that the Army 
professional culture is ‘out of balance’” (Pierce, 2010, p. 97). However, in large 
organizations, such as the U.S. Army, one might posit that there are likely to be differing 
cultures across sub-organizations, such as commands, posts, and so forth. Interestingly, 
Pierce’s (2010) study’s empirical data strongly alludes to a homogeneous culture within the 
U.S. Army’s officer corps with effectively no statistically significant disparities between 10 
demographic groups. But what about the acquisition workforce specifically? 
In a 2014 survey of acquisition workforce leaders designed to portray the viewpoints 
and perceptions of the acquisition community on the status of government acquisitions, the 
Professional Services Council (PSC) and Grant Thornton LLP (2015) questioned 51 federal 
acquisition workforce members, young professionals and senior leaders, with findings 
covering five principal areas: Budget Uncertainty, Workforce, Access to Innovation, 
Communications and Collaboration, and Oversight and Compliance (PSC, 2015). Albeit 
qualitative in nature, the survey provides insight into the cultural psyche of the acquisition 
workforce. In summarizing their results, the authors provide some key indicators that those 
surveyed view their organizational culture as being mechanistic, characterized by 
hierarchical oversight, lack of innovation, prescriptive policies, and a “punitive, rigid, risk-
averse environment” (PSC, 2015, p. 14). Recognizing USD(AT&L) Frank Kendall’s initiative 
for the acquisition workforce to think, the report notes that, “if getting the workforce to ‘think’ 
is a primary objective, the environment in which they work needs a great deal of attention” 
(PSC, 2015, p. 14), and that Congress, federal agencies including the DoD, and industry 
“must work together to build a smarter, more strategic acquisition ecosystem in which the 
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workforce is encouraged and empowered to think and decide rather than check a box to 
avoid a mountain of congressional attention for the tiniest of errors” (PSC, 2015, p. 15).  
As this survey anecdotally suggests, today’s acquisition community follows the five 
simple principles of scientific management pioneered and advocated for the industrial age 
factory by American engineer Frederick Taylor, the principal cohort in the creation of 
mechanistic organizations: 
1. “Shift all responsibility for organizing the work from the worker to the 
manager.” DoDI 5000.02, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System, can 
be viewed as a shift in responsibility for organizing the operation of a 
program from program manager to Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) 
leadership. Although Kendall clearly states in the memorandum announcing 
its most recent release that the acquisition models are “not alternatives from 
which a Program Manager must choose; they serve as examples and 
starting points that can and should be tailored to the actual product being 
acquired” (Kendall, 2015, p. 1), in a risk-adverse environment, the tendency 
is to follow the instructions. 
2. “Use scientific methods to determine the most efficient way of doing work.” 
While Taylor’s mindset reflected the industrial age factory and the use of 
time studies in designing specific tasks, one could posit that the defense 
acquisition system works similarly with an emphasis on collection and 
analysis of program data to dictate best practices from earlier programs. 
3. “Select the best person to perform the job thus designed.” Individuals are 
assigned within a functional cohort and trained primarily with that cohort, 
especially in higher level Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act 
(DAWIA) courses. Trend results indicate those functional employees feel 
that their opinions are not highly valued outside their functional area. 
4. “Train the worker to do the work efficiently.” Frisbee and Reynolds (2014) 
argue that the DoD education system, specifically the DoD’s corporate 
university for acquisition education, Defense Acquisition University (DAU), is 
“designed to develop process experts” (p. 18), not critical thinkers. Even 
higher level DAWIA courses, such as the Level III program management 
course, are designed to teach, emphasize, and test policy knowledge. 
Recently, the development effort on the Acquisition Workforce Qualification 
Initiative demonstrates a similar path with its “check the box” emphasis on 
completing steps and tasks to achieve specific qualifications. 
5. “Monitor worker performance to ensure that the appropriate work procedures 
are followed and that appropriate results are achieved” (Morgan, 2006, p. 
23). DoD oversight is replete with examples of monitoring programs for 
process adherence to include expenditure/obligation rates, earned value 
management metrics, DAES reports, and so forth. As Frisbee and Reynolds 
(2014) elucidate, program managers (PMs) have been taught “how to build 
and present briefings, how to speak to the media, how to build budgets and 
track expenditures and on myriad other steps necessary to develop, acquire 
and sustain America’s weapon systems. These are necessary skills, but 
they are not sufficient” (p. 18). 
Yet, as noted by the 2014 Acquisition Policy Survey report, respondents recognize 
the need for both oversight and compliance, that is, hierarchical control (PSC, 2015). Most 
of the items and processes stated in the previous list in the Taylor analogy have definite 
worth. However, a way must be found to offset and balance the necessity of an overarching 
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mechanistic organization with a methodology that promotes critical thinking, tailoring to 
specific circumstances, and learning new ways to adapt to the ever-changing, complex 
dynamics of the acquisition environment. Heidi Shyu, Assistant Secretary of the Army for 
Acquisitions, agrees that the current bureaucracy inhibits the participation of small and 
medium-sized companies, likening the government’s response to a troubled program to 
what happens with an overturned bus: “Industry will throw the best people in to turn the bus 
upright and get it moving. At the Pentagon, everybody sees [the bus], and what do they do? 
Shoot out the tires and windows and the kneecap of the bus driver. They don’t have the 
same vested interest as a corporation. It’s painful. It’s a fascinating culture to see” (Aitoro, 
2014, p. 2). Recent efforts by Rep. Mac Thornberry (R-Texas), Chairman of the House 
Armed Service Committee, at establishing acquisition reform are focusing on reduced 
bureaucracy; he highlights one example where “Congress was concerned that some 
programs were not paying enough attention to corroding metals. The bureaucracy’s 
response to that was that every program had to have a corrosion prevention report that had 
to be staffed and written before that program could proceed—even computer software” 
(Serbu, 2015, p. 1). 
DAU provides an example of the organization as a machine metaphor. While 
professors have some input into the process of educating the acquisition workforce, the 
preponderance of course material, method of instruction (i.e., online or residential), class 
length, and evaluation techniques are controlled by the Washington, DC–located 
headquarters. As Morgan (2006) so aptly puts it, “all the ‘thinking’ is done by the managers 
and designers, leaving all the ‘doing’ to the employers” (p. 23). Faculty are given some 
opportunities to influence new course material; however, due to the control necessitated by 
worldwide, precision-required operations and the challenge of presenting a consistent 
educational message across five geographically dispersed regional campuses and their 
satellite offices, the mechanistic organizational model has been adopted. DAU’s mechanistic 
organizational structure is not abnormal for corporate universities. Research by Abel and Li 
(2012) found that many corporate universities employ the centralized model often 
associated with mechanistic organizations, and use a more formal construct since 
educational activities are “centrally coordinated and managed” (p. 107). The strengths of 
using the mechanistic organization for DAU include instruction that provides consistent 
training and tasks that are straight-forward employing prescribed curriculum, resulting in low 
task variability (Hatch & Cunliffe, 2013; Morgan, 2006). However, since life experiences of 
DAU’s student are so diverse, task analyzability is also low, which describes the craft 
technology condition of Perrow’s typology (Hatch & Cunliffe, 2013). Unfortunately, routine 
technologies are typically the better match with a mechanistic organization than craft 
technology, resulting in the limitations of the DAU mechanistic organization becoming 
apparent (Hatch & Cunliffe, 2013). One of the severe limitations described by Morgan 
(2006), “great difficulty adapting to change” (p. 28), plagues DAU. DAU’s ability to quickly 
create new curriculum and teach updated lessons due to new DoD policy is a recognized 
weakness, confirmed by “rapid deployment training” taking months, instead of days or 
weeks, to deploy. However, many of the other limitations that Morgan (2006) presents, for 
example, the potential demotivating effect on workers, are offset with other opportunities, 
such as consulting and research, that professors are encouraged to pursue with great 
latitude. 
While these examples, along with the 2014 Acquisition Policy Survey, provide some 
good qualitative data, more data and analysis is appropriate to understand the rank-and-file 
acquisition workforce’s perception of the command in which they work, as well as their 
immediate organization.  
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Quantitative Methodology 
A number of research projects have been conducted as the wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan have shown the need for military operators to demonstrate flexibility and agility 
in decision-making. However, a literature search has revealed only limited, qualitative 
research for the acquisition workforce. 
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
The scientific aim of this research is to establish the need to move from mechanistic 
to layered learning organizations in an effort to encourage and enhance critical thinking 
among organizational members. The quantitative research questions directly applicable to 
the survey are as follows: 
 Do acquisition workforce members perceive that they work for a mechanistic 
organization at the immediate level, that is, branch, division, staff office? 
 Do acquisition workforce members perceive that they work for a mechanistic 
organization at the top level, that is, larger HQs or DoD-level organizations? 
Answering these research questions through the use of the a survey instrument, 
specifically focused on organizational structure, has the potential to provide the DoD with a 
practical roadmap to create layered learning organizations, thus enhancing critical thinking 
among its organizational members while retaining hierarchical control mechanisms.  
 Hypothesis 1: Acquisition workforce members perceive that they work for a 
mechanistic organization at the immediate level, that is, branch, division, staff 
office. 
The expectation is that acquisition workforce members will perceive that, overall, 
they work for an immediate organization with mechanistic characteristics; however, 
responses will vary greatly as individual leaders influence perceptions across the spectrum 
from mechanistic to learning behaviors. 
 Hypothesis 2: Acquisition workforce members will more strongly perceive that 
they work for a mechanistic organization at the top level, that is, larger HQs 
or DoD-level organizations. 
The expectation is that acquisition members will perceive that, overall, they work for 
a top-level organization with mechanistic characteristics and that those perceptions will 
indicate stronger mechanistic behaviors than their immediate organizations, as the DoD 
hierarchical culture influences perceptions. 
Research Design 
The most appropriate research design for exploring these hypotheses is to conduct 
surveys that can capture the perceptions of acquisition workforce members across multiple 
functional areas, years of experience, services, and organizational type. Questionnaires are 
an appropriate and relatively easy way to collect information across a wide population for 
studying behavioral items (Cozby & Bates, 2012). The research design consists of a simple, 
one-page questionnaire to be conducted across multiple DAU–Midwest classes, developed 
specifically to minimize the time required to distribute and complete in order to encourage 
participation, since it is being conducted using class time.  
While the preference would be to investigate the hypotheses across the entire 
population of interest, that is, all acquisition workforce professionals characterizing all 
organizational types, services, areas of the country, and experience levels, that would be 
too costly, impractical, or even impossible (Acharya et al., 2013). Therefore, due to time and 
cost constraints, and a population size of over 100,000 acquisition workers (45,443 Army, 
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40,651 Navy, and 25,075 Air Force), sampling was restricted to students attending DAU 
courses at DAU–Midwest campuses, that is, convenience sampling (DAU, 2007). The 
disadvantage of convenience sampling is that bias could be introduced since a sampling of 
DAU–Midwest students, which likely includes a large percentage of students from the local 
USAF base—Wright-Patterson AFB—may not be an accurate representation of the overall 
acquisition workforce population (Cozby & Bates, 2012). 
Population and Sample 
Questionnaires were made available to all acquisition workforce students taking 
classes at DAU–Midwest campuses from mid-February 2015 through early-March 2015. The 
limitation in time was due to the requirement for the questionnaire to be approved for use 
with human subjects (exempt determination made by ARDEC’s Institutional Review Board) 
and data analysis time requirements. With an acquisition workforce population of over 
100,000, a sample size of 384 participants would be required to provide a precision of 
estimates of +5% with a 95% confidence level; whereas, 96 student participants would be 
required for +10% accuracy (Cozby & Bates, 2012). A total of 164 surveys were collected.  
Measures/Instrumentation 
A survey instrument (see appendix) was developed specifically for this research. 
Perceptions of mechanistic and/or learning organizational behavior are based on two main 
variables, decision-making and rules bias. The survey is divided into two sections. The first 
section includes a four quadrant diagram requesting that participants indicate their 
perception of their top-level and immediate organization using two scales: Flexible/Adaptive 
to Change to Formal/Rule-Based and Participative Decision-Making to Highly-Centralized 
Decision-Making. The second section consists of five questions employing a 5-point Likert 
scale used for each item (1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree). In order to better 
understand the acquisition workforce perceptions on the organizational culture, the following 
demographic variable data were collected: years of experience, functional area, and 
organizational type.  
Data Collection Procedures and Analysis 
With the permission of instructors and consent of students, the questionnaire was 
completed during class. The questionnaire consists of an informed consent message on one 
side and Sections 1 and 2 on the reverse. Students who did not want to participate could 
either not accept it or hand it back in blank. Upon completion, students anonymously 
returned the surveys to a box at the front of the room. 
Due to time constraints for both collection and analysis of data, coupled with an 
apparent ambiguity in the survey instrument, data analysis for each question was limited to 
between 108 to 164 responses. Future research should modify the survey instrument to 
provide better clarity and be performed electronically to facilitate more comprehensive data 
analysis. Also, to ensure that the research is not flawed by an alternative explanation, a 
succession of t-tests, using a significance level of .05, should be conducted to verify that the 
data does not vary significantly based on any of the demographic variables.  
That being said, the data collected did reveal some important trends in the 
perceptions of the current acquisition workforce, even as the limited number of participants 
only provides for an accuracy between +5% and +10% given a 95% level of confidence. 
Most notably, the participants’ perceptions of their top level organizational culture revealed a 
strong trend for mechanistic behavior. Figure 1 shows that 77% of the participants who 
submitted unambiguous surveys perceive their top-level organization—that is, command 
headquarters—as mechanistic, demonstrating highly-centralized decision-making with a 
reliance on formal procedures and rules. However, when respondents shared their 
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perspectives of the organizational behavior existent within their immediate organization—
that is, division, branch, program management office—the results were varied with no clear 
trends evident, with the top two responses being diametrically opposed, representing 
characteristics of both learning and mechanistic organizations (see Figure 2). 
 
 Top-Level Organizational Behaviors 
 
 Immediate Organizational Behaviors 
Similar trend data were found in the first two questions: “I am encouraged to think 
‘outside the box’” (see Figure 3), and “I am encouraged to follow policy ‘to the letter’” (see 
Figure 4). Whereas these questions were designed to elicit different responses based on the 
participants’ perceptions of mechanistic behavior in the workplace, both of these questions 
were answered with high agreement rates. Question 1 received either “agree” or “strongly 
agree” ratings from 68% of respondents, and Question 2 received either agree or strongly 
agree ratings from 69% of respondents, indicating that although they are encouraged to 
“think outside the box,” they are also encouraged to follow policy “to the letter.” Part of the 
rationale for this duality may reside in the question not clearly stating which organization to 
rate—top or immediate. 
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 Question 1 
 
 Question 2 
Question 3, “My inputs are valued and considered in decision-making,” also found a 
favorable rating, with 65% of the respondents indicating agreement (see Figure 5). 
However, when asked if their opinions on items outside their functional area were valued 
(Question 5; see Figure 7), a diverse response was found, with the most popular responses 
being “neutral” (35%) and over 61% either being neutral or in disagreement. These results 
are not surprising since specialization of jobs, with clear-cut responsibilities, are inherent in 
mechanistic organizations and has the advantage of expectation management, but also 
suffers from a lack of flexibility and initiative when the organization faces complex, changing 
circumstances (Morgan, 1986). 
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 Question 3 
 
 Question 4 
 
 Question 5 
Responses to Question 4, “My top organization values risk-taking to improve 
operations,” correspond with the top-level organizational behaviors’ data (see Figure 6). 
Most respondents felt that their top organization did not agree with this statement as over 
77% of the respondents perceived risk-taking by their command organization, indicated by a 
neutral, disagree, or strongly disagree response. 
Results  
Although the ambiguity of the survey and the inability to acquire the 384 acquisition 
workforce responses necessary for +5% accuracy diminished the ability to provide definitive 
quantitative results, indications and data trends support the 2014 Acquisition Policy Survey 
report findings of strong mechanistic behaviors with pockets of learning behaviors at the 
lower levels. Both Hypotheses 1 and 2 are supported; however, more diversity in responses 
relevant to Hypothesis 1 was evident than anticipated. Respondents indicated through their 
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identification on the matrix and their ratings to the five questions that perceptions are strong 
that top-level organizations are mechanistic. However, the diversity of responses specific to 
their immediate organization indicates a wide variance between participative versus highly 
centralized decision-making, and flexible versus rules-based operations.  
Building Layered Learning Organizations Within the Construct of a 
Mechanistic Culture 
For all of its faults, the case can be made for the necessity of the boundaries and 
controls of the mechanistic organization construct as an overarching vehicle, in which critical 
thinking and innovation can thrive. Shields (2003) recognizes the importance of an 
overarching bureaucratic organization in its ability to “promote military professionalism, 
seamlessly implement complicated logistics and procure the best weapons for the job” (p. 
181). Williams (2009) argues that true innovation can only exist within the boundaries of 
control and mechanistic structure, ensuring fair treatment for employees and bounding 
innovators from push[ing] their inclinations too far … lead[ing] to belligerence, chaos, 
disastrous experimentation, and unprincipled opportunism” (p. 61). Policies, regulations and 
statutes when viewed as tools versus obstacles can enhance critical thought and negate the 
mavericks that circumvent strictly in the name of expediency, while encouraging risk-taking 
along with its potential for failure, but resisting the dispersion of the necessary boundary and 
control systems designed to balance warfighter needs and a responsibility to be good 
stewards of the taxpayers’ money (Williams, 2009).  
Research also indicates that the age and size of the DoD dictates a tendency 
towards mechanistic behavior, postulating that older institutions are more rigid and less 
adaptable to change and that larger organizations also promote rigidity and a cumbersome 
environmental change response (Walonick, 1993). Yet, even larger organizations promote 
decentralization by allowing lower-level managers autonomy and flexibility, even as they 
employ formalization of rules and procedures to retain control over strategic decisions 
(Hatch & Cunliffe, 2013). Large U.S. corporations such as McDonalds, with its 33,000 
restaurants and 1.7 million workers across 119 nations, understand that their 68 million 
customers per day are demanding changes that their famously consistent and efficient 
mechanistic organization is slow to handle (Hatch & Cunliffe, 2013). As a result, McDonalds 
is edging towards a more organic approach by providing business units greater flexibility 
and autonomy to meet local customer demands (Hatch & Cunliffe, 2013). So why not build a 
layered system of learning organizations (Figure 8) within the overall construct of the DoD 
acquisition’s mechanistic organization to promote critical thinking on policy issues at the top 
and innovation in program management techniques at the lower levels? 
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 Layered Learning Organizations in a Hierarchical Organization  
Senge (1990) popularized the concept of learning organizations, defining them as 
“organizations where people continually expand their capacity to create results they truly 
desire, where new and expansive patterns of thinking are nurtured, where collective 
aspiration is set free, and where people are continually learning how to learn together” (p. 
3). The power of a learning organization is that its leaders and workers promote work-
related learning with a free flow of information to encourage new ways of doing business, 
continually improving upon established procedures, learning from mistakes, and adapting to 
new realities more readily (Giesecke & McNeil, 2004). The learning metaphor refers to an 
organization built for maximum flexibility, dynamically responsive to changes in the 
environment with little to no hierarchical social structure. Information and intelligence is 
distributed throughout so that the organization can self-organize and adapt to evolving 
challenges (Morgan, 2006). As these organizations learn to learn, the need to question the 
relevance of operational norms is required to develop cultures that “support change and risk 
taking” (Morgan, 2013, p. 91). Mitzberg (1983) describes such an organizational structure as 
an adhocracy, where the need for constant innovation in a turbulent environment 
necessitates a structure of “interacting project teams whose task is to innovate solutions to 
constantly changing problems” (Hatch & Cunliffe, 2013, p. 109). An empowered, cross-
functional team developed to handle a particular situation within a larger mechanistic 
organization may adopt the learning metaphor to innovate and solve the crisis it has been 
assigned. Research indicates that while the mechanistic organization is adept at decision-
making in problematic situations, such as those in which a tiger team would be employed, a 
learning organizational approach more positively affects decision-making in non-problematic 
situations, that is, innovative or continuous improvement processes (Bolfikova, Hrehova, & 
Frenova, 2010). 
An important addition to DoDI 5000.02 furthers Kendall’s call for more critical thought 
by requiring program managers to include framing assumptions. Mark Husband (2015), 
senior advisor for Root Cause Analyses in the Office of Performance Assessments and Root 
Cause Analyses (PARCA), defines framing assumptions as “any supposition, explicit or 
implicit, that is central in shaping cost, schedule, or performance expectations of an 
acquisition program” (p. 1). In essence, framing assumptions deepens learning from single-
loop learning to double-loop learning, the distinction being that single-loop learning pertains 
to improving the current process, whereas double-loop learning requires the organization to 
question the assumptions upon which their current actions are based (DiBella, 2010). As 
Morgan (2006) explains, “‘double-loop’ learning depends on what is sometimes described as 
the art of framing and reframing … organizational members must be skilled in understanding 
the paradigms, metaphors, mind-sets, or mental models that underpin how the organization 
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works … [and] able to develop new ones when appropriate” (pp. 89–90). Implementation of 
these new ideas, employing the best practices and acquisition framework found in DoDI 
5000.02 as a guide, becomes critical as PMs and other acquisition functional members will 
only pursue change through critical thought if they believe those ideas will be fairly 
evaluated and implemented with some level of risk accepted (Garvin, 1993). 
An example of where a disciplined review of framing assumption would have been 
beneficial is found in a current DoD weapon systems acquisition program. The program’s 
production line was interrupted in order to produce critically needed assets of a different 
configuration, an urgent operational need (UON). However, in recent contract negotiations 
for a follow-on production lot, both government program office and the contractor were still 
pursuing full rate production of the previous configuration with little valid cost data to base a 
firm-fixed price contract-type decision on. The framing assumption that was not critically 
thought through should be “the low rate initial production (LRIP) line will be stable.” With 
framing assumptions established and evaluated for validity, the program could benefit from 
an additional LRIP lot using a Fixed Price Incentive (Firm Target) (FPIF)–type contract with 
an aggressive share line (50/50) to encourage the contractor to aggressively pursue cost 
savings initiatives. 
The Layered Approach and Culture Change 
The cultural impediments within the DoD, as linked to its hierarchical control and 
mechanistic structure, make the grand leap of the DoD to a learning organization 
impractical. DiBella (2010) makes the valid point that the Army “will never be one monolithic 
learning organization” (p. 122). However, as depicted in Figure 8, within the bounds of three 
organization levels, the learning metaphor can be adopted if leaders develop a culture with 
low power distance and low uncertainty avoidance cultural value dimensions (CVDs). 
Personnel within three organizational levels are more likely to adopt these CVDs and the 
learning metaphor since hierarchal control and increased risk-taking can result from an open 
organizational culture, characteristic of a learning construct, tending towards adaptability 
and away from the prescribed practices and procedures that are found in rigid, rules-based, 
closed organizational cultures, characteristic of a mechanistic organization (Nahavandi, 
1993). For double-loop learning, which includes examination of the status quo and 
consideration of alternative ways of doing business, cultures must be developed that 
encourage change and risk-taking (Morgan, 2006). With rapid change and high risk, the 
acceptance of failure and openness towards conflicting views must exist for the organization 
to be successful (Morgan, 2006). This concept of differentiation, referring to a single 
company operating different organizational constructs to account for varying levels of 
uncertainty and change experienced by individual departments, is not uncommon (Hatch & 
Cunliffe, 2013). 
 In the U.S. technology sector, companies need to stay on the technological cutting 
edge by developing and capitalizing on change. Their research and development (R&D) 
departments encourage innovation through organizational metaphors such as organism or 
brain, that is, learning organizations (Morgan, 2006). However, their production departments 
should efficiently produce quality products, a task more conducive to mechanistic 
organizations. Differentiation allows these two different metaphors to co-exist. Integration, 
referring to the collaboration required to achieve common goals, allows for successful co-
existence. The R&D department needs to create products that can be affordably produced 
by the production department in order for the sales department to successfully market those 
products, leading to maximized profits, an overall corporate goal. However, the more 
differentiation is obtained through diversifying the internal operations, the harder it is to 
achieve integration (Hatch & Cunliffe, 2013). Organizations that tend to be market-focused 
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and opportunistic often encounter integration issues, while well-integrated, controlled teams 
have difficulty dealing with environmental change (Fey & Denison, 2003). One could posit 
that DoD integration would be challenged by the differentiation of an overarching 
mechanistic structure with layered learning organizations, especially as military leaders 
move from operational units to the acquisition commands. However, these challenges can 
be met with the shared, articulated vision of national security through cultural values and 
artifacts. 
While organizational change may include certain practical aspects, such as new 
technologies, employee skills and motivation, and organizational structure, what is most 
critical to effective transformation lies in the changes to its culture (Morgan, 2006). Strong 
organizational cultures “generate an almost tangible social force field of energy that 
empowers employees” (p. 4) and can be linked to increased performance (Ojo, 2010). While 
the basic assumptions’ layer of culture will not change as progress is sought from 
hierarchical, mechanistic organizations to layered learning sub-organizations, espoused 
values articulated through visible artifacts will need to change for organizational change to 
occur. The second layer of organizational culture, espoused values, provides the mission, 
goals, standards, and other measures designed to shape an organization’s plans, decision-
making, and leadership actions (Duke & Edet, 2012). To switch from the mechanistic value 
of adherence to the regulations to one of adaption to uncertainty and complexity, leadership 
will need to ensure responsible risk-taking is preferred and failure is acceptable. 
Organizations tend towards the comfort of stability with reliable managers instinctively 
seeking to reduce risk through controls and structure, yet at the “price of diminished 
innovation and zeal” (Jain, 2013, p. 106). The building of a learning organization demands 
that “the shift goes all the way to [the] core of the culture” (Kofman & Senge, 1993, p. 17). 
However, Morgan (2006) elucidates that leaders who “understand the challenge of culture 
change recognize the enormity of [the] task” (p. 138), especially considering that Senge et 
al. (1994) has described government as “difficult soil for learning organizations to grow in” 
(p. 493). Culture is not something easily swayed, but rather needs to be cultivated over time 
(Morgan, 2006). The characteristics of the learning organization will need to be championed 
repetitively through the use of artifacts. Artifacts are markers of basic cultural assumptions 
and values, manifested by objects, verbal expressions, and activities (Hatch & Cunliffe, 
2013). Formalization of new values coupled with consistency between words and actions 
can drive trust and create an atmosphere conducive to change (Michailova, 2000). 
Using the modernist perspective in exploring the effects of organizational culture on 
change, Hatch and Cunliffe (2013) cite the research of Dan Denison, who “proposed that an 
organization’s strategy, culture and environment need to be aligned if an organization is to 
achieve high performance” (p. 186). Modernists believe that if culture affects behavior, then 
by managing the culture, the preferred behaviors will develop (Hatch & Cunliffe, 2013). In 
today’s dynamic and complex acquisition environment, organizations that value flexibility 
and change are likely to perform best (Hatch and Cunliffe, 2013). New characteristics that 
change the radical frame of reference to a unitary frame of reference need to be embedded 
in all the parts through shared core values, which in turn replace the domineering set of 
rules and laws used to control the workforce (Morgan, 2006). A unitary frame of reference is 
characterized by working “under the umbrella of common goals” (p. 195), where “conflict is a 
rare and transient phenomenon” (p. 195), and power is the “managerial prerogative of 
guiding the organization toward the achievement of common interests” (Morgan, 2006, p. 
196). Organizational leadership will need to “change their leadership roles from one of 
directing and controlling organizational activities, to inspiring, supporting and facilitating 
them” (Hatch & Cunliffe, 2013, p. 100). Leaders will need to incentivize the transition of the 
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culture from one that desires hierarchical control to one that values innovation and 
encourages debate (Fairbanks, 2006; Murray & Millet, 1996).  
Leadership and the Creation of Learning Organizations 
The autocratic leader would destroy the double-loop learning process, as he or she 
would not take kindly to their status quo being examined and challenged. Morgan (2006) 
writes that leaders are often hesitant to trust the self-directing work characteristic of learning 
organizations and resort to more traditional hierarchal techniques. If this were to occur and 
strong centralized control manifest with it, employees working in a learning organization may 
resent the loss of autonomy, likely resulting in lack of job satisfaction and, potentially, high 
attrition rates. Unfortunately, as DiBella (2010) points out, the “military culture rewards 
bravado and the projection of confidence rather than humility and the projection of 
uncertainty or ambivalence … constrain[ing] openness … the free flow of data” (p. 121), that 
is, the military culture rewards the characteristics of an autocratic leader. Gerras (2008) 
elucidates that the most significant barrier to critical thinking and, therefore learning 
organizations, is the egocentrism that exists in military leaders, cultivated over a career “as 
rank and responsibility progress” (p. 8) and characterized by “exceptional confidence with 
respect to both who they are and the validity, accuracy, and correctness of their views” (p. 
8). 
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) noted that PMs leading successful 
programs shared several attributes, including “communication skills that facilitate open and 
honest decision making” (GAO, 2010, p. 14). The GAO (2010) report also revealed that the 
PMs, despite the appearance of lack of bravado and subsequent risk to one’s career, readily 
admitted programmatic issues using honest, candid communication, which in turn increased 
their credibility amongst all stakeholders, including their industry counterparts. Leaders in a 
learning organization cannot be defensive, but must be receptive to criticism and employees 
bearing bad news (Garvin, 1993). By using Ouchi’s concept of clan control, where new 
organizational members are socialized into the culture and thus internalize the DoD’s 
values, principles, and purpose, the members of the DoD leadership who control promotions 
can heavily influence the behavior and direction that the DoD adopts (Hatch & Cunliffe, 
2013). Learning organizations benefit from the openness that thrives from a humble leader 
who readily admits not knowing everything and a willingness to learn from subordinates 
(DiBella, 2010). 
Humility 
Humility can be defined as treating others with respect, avoiding special privileges 
and status symbols, admitting limitations and mistakes, exhibiting modesty about 
achievements, and emphasizing the collective contributions of others (Yukl, 2013). Davis et 
al. (2011) expresses humility using a twofold approach, an intrapersonal level having an 
accurate view of oneself; and an interpersonal level having an other-orientation versus self-
focus, characterized by respect and a restraint of egotistical intentions. One could posit that 
the other-orientation leads to putting the good of the organization and others first, thereby 
allowing the use of conflict to “increase awareness of problems that need to be addressed, 
result in broader and more productive searches for solutions, and generally facilitate positive 
change, adaptation and innovation” (Ivancevich, Konopaske, & Matteson, 2011, p. 311). 
Since humble people understand, accept, and are willing to admit their shortcomings, they 
are more apt to acknowledge their need for help, portray thankfulness, feel loved, and 
extend trust (Exline, 2012). In other words, for functional conflict, which Ivancevich et al. 
(2011) define as “a confrontation between groups that enhances and benefits the 
organization’s performance” (p. 311), that is, learning, humility appears to be the key 
determinate. Humility is the crucial attribute, since humble people are “freed from the 
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tyranny of their ego” (Gunn, 2002, p. 14). Humble people know that no matter what you 
accomplish, you are just one among many, making it feasible to grasp that you can serve a 
larger purpose (Gunn, 2002).  
Jim Collins’ (2001) economics research into what drove only 11 out of 1,435 
companies to make the leap from “good to great” led to a conclusion that his team of 22 
researchers didn’t expect—a special type of leader. Collins (2001) coined this leadership 
perspective “Level 5 Leadership,” characterized by “a paradoxical combination of personal 
humility and unrelenting, professional will” (p. 140). Collins (2001) identified humility as the 
differential between good leaders, such as Lee Iacocca, former CEO of Chrysler, and great 
leaders, such as Darwin Smith, CEO of Kimberly-Clark, in building organizations that sustain 
performance. Unfortunately, DoD leaders are rewarded for their confidence, which 
reinforces an absolutist tendency and egocentric bias, thus inhibiting acceptance of other 
viewpoints and perhaps leading to arrogant, “not invented here” behaviors (Clarke, 2008). 
Also critical is that Level 5 leaders are characterized by ‘‘an almost stoic determination to do 
whatever needs to be done” to make their organizations great (Collins, 2008).  
Professional Will 
Collins (2005) writes that a leader with unrelenting, professional will stimulates an 
organization to produce superior results, “demonstrating an unwavering tenacity to do 
whatever must be done to produce the best long-term results, regardless of difficulty” (p. 7). 
However, Clarke (2008) elucidates that most Army officers focus on short-term goals and 
the process rather than the product. Some blame the lack of a long-term result focus on 
program manager longevity; however, the 2014 Performance of the Defense Acquisition 
System report, citing research by Ferreiro (2012) and their own analysis, found no statistical 
or qualitative correlation between program manager tenure and unit-cost growth, Nunn-
McCurdy breaches, or two MDAP cost growth measures—total RDT&E and quantity-
adjusted procurement (USD[AT&L], 2014). Another potential culprit is the way that the DoD 
evaluates its officers and civilian leaders with an emphasis on short-term, individual 
achievements vice long-term, organizational goals (Williams, 2009).  
This short-term, individual focus, especially in the up-or-out world of officer 
promotions and combined with our national cultural values of individualism and 
competitiveness (The Hofstede Center, n.d.), led one study, Army Professionalism, the 
Military Ethic, and Officership in the 21st Century (1999), to conclude that “the 
encroachment of egoism (‘What is good is what’s best for me’) pervades the Army 
leadership” (Williams, 2009, p. 64). This suggests that a leader may decide upon a certain 
path based on personal advancement thoughts vice “whatever must be done to produce the 
best long-term results” (Collins, 2005, p. 7). The up-or-out reality can create an 
overemphasis on competition, where short-term results and looking good now trumps 
performance over the long haul (Kofman & Senge, 1993). However, even long-term 
organizational goals must be coupled with ethical leadership. Establishing hard, specific 
goals does not come without risks, as several specific negative side effects have emerged. 
In the early 1990s, Sears established a stretch goal to its automobile repair departments of 
$147 per hour, creating a motivation that drove their workers to deceive customers by 
recommending and performing unnecessary repairs (Ordóñez et al., 2009). Difficult goals 
can challenge employee ethical behavior, as the narrow focus and drive towards those 
goals, especially with the noble cause of national defense and keeping our soldiers, airmen, 
seamen, and marines safe, can cause program management teams to fixate on 
accomplishing specific performance goals without regard for greater DoD organizational 
goals and values.  
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ãW=
`êÉ~íáåÖ=póåÉêÖó=Ñçê=fåÑçêãÉÇ=`Ü~åÖÉ= - 82 - 
One DoD example is the Navy’s A-12 medium attack aircraft that was awarded a 
$4.38 billion contract to the team of McDonnell-Douglas and General Dynamics Fort Worth 
in 1988. Eckhardt (1996) maps the case of a program manager, Navy Captain Elberfeld, 
whose zealousness for the program led to an advocacy not supported by the facts, along 
with unethical behavior, such as the ordering of defective parts to be staged in the assembly 
area for SECDEF Cheney’s plant visit in March 1990. The fierce resolve for the program’s 
success went beyond Captain Elberfeld, who was ultimately fired and censured, as Navy 
and DoD acquisition leadership ignored an OSD analyst report showing the program to be 
$500 million over cost, two years behind schedule, and greater than 5,000 lbs overweight, 
ultimately leading to the resignation of Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition John 
Betti, termination of the A-12 program for contractor default, and, subsequently, the largest 
lawsuit ever filed against the U.S. government, which languished in the federal courts for 
over 20 years (Eckhardt, 1996).  
This is not to dictate that pride in one’s program is all bad; as Locke and Latham 
(2009) elucidate, these potential pitfalls of goal-setting can be mitigated by managerial 
attention and strong, ethical leadership, citing that “organizations cannot thrive without being 
focused on their desired end results any more than an individual can thrive without goals to 
provide a sense of purpose” (p. 22). The DoD’s focus on warfighter goals can be an 
advantage; Williams (2009) cites Jordan (2002), whose study indicates that the defense 
industry perceives the DoD’s definition of success as focused on accomplishing mutual 
goals vice individual achievements. Program managers should follow the lead of the CEOs 
from the 11 companies out of the 1,435 companies that Collins (2001) studied that went 
from “good to great,” who all demonstrated an ability to put aside personal reward and fame 
for building companies that endure; one of these Level 5 executives said, “I want to look 
from my porch, see the company as one of the great companies of the world someday, and 
be able to say, ‘I used to work there’” (Collins, 2001, p. 144).  
Ultimately, the combined characteristics of humility and putting the organizational 
goals above self-interest, coupled with an ethical approach, can lead to organizational trust, 
an essential ingredient in building learning organizations. 
Organizational Trust  
The building of learning organizations requires organizations to better understand 
and facilitate trust within their organizations. Diversity in the workplace requires that people 
well work together beyond being based strictly on common backgrounds, interests, and 
interpersonal likenesses (Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995). More companies are flattening 
their organizational structures and providing opportunities for individuals and teams to work 
autonomously, where trust must take the place of daily, direct observation of their efforts. 
Trends, such as teleworking or virtual teams, where employees work from a location such as 
their home, separate employees from their immediate supervisor and require mutual trust in 
order to be effective.  
The definition of trust has been nuanced by researchers as the number of scholarly 
articles and books have proliferated on the subject. In their development of an integrative 
model of organizational trust, Mayer et al. (1995) have defined trust as “the willingness of a 
party to be vulnerable to the actions of another party based on the expectation that the other 
will perform a particular action important to the trust or, irrespective of the ability to monitor 
or control the other party” (p. 712). They posit that trustworthiness is conditioned upon three 
factors: ability, “that group of skills, competencies, and characteristics that enable each party 
to have influence within some specific domain” (p. 717); benevolence, “the extent to which a 
trustee is believed to want to do good to the trustor, aside from an egocentric profit motive” 
(p. 718); and integrity, which “involves the trustor’s perception that the trustee adheres to a 
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set of principles that the trustor finds acceptable” (p. 719). Dirks and Ferrin (2002) tie the 
relationship of trust with ability, benevolence, and integrity in their meta-analysis of 93 
articles across four decades of research on the subject of trust in leadership. Colquitt et al. 
(2007) builds upon the work of Dirks and Ferrin (2002) and Mayer et al. (1995) by 
emphasizing the fourth dimension of trust propensity, defined by Mayer et al. (1995) as, “a 
stable within-party factor that will affect the likelihood the party will trust” (p. 715), noting that 
personal experience, personality, and cultural dimensions all play into trust propensity. One 
could posit that humility with its intentionality towards others versus self would be essential 
to interpersonal trust. Covey & Merrill (2006) posit that trust produces faster results at lower 
costs and consists of “four cores of credibility”—integrity, intent, capability, and results. Their 
trust behaviors include the following; talk straight, demonstrate respect, create transparency, 
right wrongs, show loyalty, deliver results, get better, confront reality, clarify expectations, 
practice accountability, listen first, keep commitments, and extend trust (Covey & Merrill, 
2006). 
Trust-building and high-trust relationships are crucial in learning organizations, 
encouraging workforces to embrace change and face uncertainty (Gill, Levine, & Pitt, 1998). 
Trust constitutes the driving force that allows employees to experiment and adapt to a 
changing culture (Rubinstein & Firstenberg, 1999). Interestingly, the DoD culture runs 
contrary to the national culture of low power distance and individualism (The Hofstede 
Center, n.d.). One could posit that the camaraderie one finds in military units, with their high 
sense of purpose, leads to higher in-group collectivism than societal norms; however, the 
perceived necessity of a wartime command hierarchal structure drives a higher power 
distance CVD than societal norms. Huff and Kelley (2005) elucidate that past studies imply a 
“strong positive relationship between trust and collectivism, and a negative relationship 
between trust and individualism” (p. 97), pointing directly to the likelihood of less 
benevolence displayed by members of an individualistic society. High collectivism would 
lend itself to a sense of responsibility for fellow members of the group; however, conversely, 
high power distance contributes to a sense of superiority, running counter to humility and, 
therefore, likely to organizational trust. Therefore, the influence of power distance may 
confound the influence of collectivism for the DoD. Thus, while an argument perhaps can be 
made that operational units require the strict command structure, support units, to include 
the buying commands, do not and should adopt the low power distance culture inherent in 
American society. This characteristic of differentiation supports the layered learning 
organizational approach advocated by this study.  
Thus, the culture of a layered learning organization is enabled by leadership 
characterized by humility and professional will, which includes a willingness to listen to other 
viewpoints, admit not knowing or being wrong, and putting the mission and others before 
self-serving goals. This creates an environment of trust, which ultimately leads to a place 
where critical thinking can be cultivated. 
Enhanced Critical Thinking 
Critical thinking is conceptual and, therefore, can be tough to define. The Defense 
System Management School and the Army’s Professional Military Education refer to the 
definition found in The Miniature Guide to Critical Thinking Concepts and Tools: “critical 
thinking is the art of analyzing and evaluating thinking with a view to improving it” (Paul & 
Elder, 2006, p. 4). A somewhat less esoteric, and perhaps more pertinent definition for the 
business of acquisitions is presented by Halpern (2003), “the use of those cognitive skills or 
strategies that increase the probability of a desirable outcome. It is used to describe thinking 
that is purposeful, reasoned, and goal directed” (p. 6). Critical thinking dates its origins to the 
days of Socrates, and is derived from two Greek words, kriticos, denoting astute judgment, 
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ãW=
`êÉ~íáåÖ=póåÉêÖó=Ñçê=fåÑçêãÉÇ=`Ü~åÖÉ= - 84 - 
and kriterion, close to our English word criterion in both character and meaning (Clarke, 
2008).  
Although numerous definitions for critical thinking have been developed by academia 
and practitioners, critical thinking boils down to the Socratic method of asking and answering 
questions, along with challenging assumptions. As many researchers have noted, the skills 
required for critical thinking are a learned characteristic and should find their root in 
established DoD educational programs, such as DAU’s DAWIA course and professional 
military education (PME). However, leadership must create an atmosphere of reasoned 
questioning and active, respectful dissent (Fastabend & Simpson, 2004). The current DoD 
structure of formal hierarchical control limits critical thought as junior officers and civilians 
are reluctant to question their immediate supervisor or their supervisor’s boss (Allen & 
Gerras, 2009). The layered learning organization enhances critical thought by establishing 
an environment at intersecting layers where presenting reasoned argument is encouraged 
and long-standing paradigms are challenged, even as the overall construct of the 
mechanistic organization persists.  
Ivancevich et al. (2011) elucidate that in years past, all conflict was thought of as 
bad; however, a more current view is that conflict, known as functional conflict, can be 
healthy and used as a change agent to drive growth in an organization. Lencioni (2002) 
goes so far as to posit that the absence of conflict is one of five key dysfunctions of teams. 
For functional conflict, which Ivancevich et al. (2011) define as “a confrontation between 
groups that enhances and benefits the organization’s performance” (p. 311), humility 
appears to be the key determinate, with its characterization of respect and a restraint of 
egotistical intentions (Davis et al., 2011). Humility can lead to thinking open-mindedly, 
acknowledging and evaluating alternate solution sets, a key sign of a well-cultivated critical 
thinker (Paul & Elder, 2006). In an effort to develop creative and critical thought, the 
atmosphere must be conducive to developing what Williams (2013) calls “heretics—leaders 
capable of challenging convention to create imaginative solutions … because it’s about 
questioning and good questioners unequivocally make better thinkers” (p. 51). The ability to 
argue well, to go beyond egotistical diatribes and call into question the status quo and open 
the team up to new alternatives while taking all perspectives into consideration, takes 
education and practice (Williams, 2013).  
However, functional conflict also requires the foundation of interpersonal and 
organizational trust (Lencioni, 2002). This trust, formed as part of the establishment of 
learning organizations, is necessary for critical thinking to succeed, as those leaders who 
squash others, especially subordinates, or adopt a “shoot the messenger” mentality, will 
contribute to risk aversion and a business-as-usual approach (Mueller, 2012). This 
combination of functional conflict and high trust allows for the formulation and articulation of 
questions and effective communication of ideas outside the status quo, both characteristics 
of a well-cultivated critical thinker and learning organizations, which is contrary to the 
feelings of those who operate within a mechanistic organization where questioning the 
conventional practice can be seen as career-limiting or fruitless, leading to apathy and risk 
aversion (Morgan, 1986; Paul & Elder, 2006; Senge, 1990). Therefore, a well-reasoned 
organizational approach is to enhance critical thinking by establishing layered learning 
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Conclusion 
Past and current perceptions of the DoD culture by society at large, as well as its 
members, indicate behaviors consistent with mechanistic organizations. Unfortunately, the 
culture tied to mechanistic organizations does not positively correlate with strong critical 
thinking. While education can and should play a role in the development of critical thinking 
skills, organizational transformation from chiefly mechanistic to layered learning should be 
pursued to encourage and nurture critical thinking as a practice. However, organizational 
change is difficult, especially when it entails cultural items such as power, organizational 
values, motivational principles, and trust. Leaders wanting to produce cultural changes face 
a formidable challenge and should recognize the immensity of the undertaking (Ivancevich 
et al., 2011; Morgan, 2006).  
Research has demonstrated that ethical leadership characterized by humility and a 
fierce professional resolve creates powerful, long-lasting, productive organizations (Collins, 
2001). Correlating with those qualities is the building of interpersonal and organizational 
trust, and accompanying functional conflict, as organizational members seek, debate, and 
differ on what is best for the organization and its customers (Lencioni, 2002). Enhanced 
critical thought can then flourish in an environment that seeks disagreement and questioning 
in a construct of layered learning sub-organizations within the overall construct of the DoD’ 
mechanistic organization.  
Due to time constraints and lack of a validated survey instrument, the quantitative 
analysis of current DoD acquisition workforce perceptions falls short. More complete 
quantitative research and longitudinal studies are recommended to understand whether the 
acquisition workforce trends away from mechanistic organizations and towards learning 
organizations, along with its effect on critical thinking practices over time. 
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